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The objective of this project is to describe, analyze, and recommend the strategy 
and process of using an Army volunteer civilian contracting deployable workforce in Iraq 
and Afghanistan particularly in terms of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) 
accomplishing the contingency contracting mission, and completing the construction 
portion of the reconstruction efforts.  The Corps has been extensively involved in the 
nation building effort in Iraq/Afghanistan using its civilian volunteers for deployment.  
To support this additional mission, the USACE has deployed civilian contingency 
contracting personnel to Iraq and Afghanistan.  This project will analyze the extent to 
which the USACE strategies and structures are accomplishing the mission, particularly in 
terms of new and emerging wartime needs and expectations.  Also analyzed are 
subsidiary factors such as an aging defense workforce and possible impacts on the 
Iraq/Afghanistan contracting mission.  Conclusions will be drawn on the extent to which 
the current volunteer structure appears to be working and possible areas for improvement.  
Recommendations will be offered on ways to encourage civilians to volunteer for 
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The purpose of this study is to provide recommendations to the USACE 
leadership on strategies to accomplish the current contracting missions in the USACE 
GRD/AED, and yet undefined future contingency/expeditionary operations.  A secondary 
purpose is to provide recommendations for sustaining the civilian voluntary contracting 
workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The overall objective of the study is to describe, and analyze, a relatively new 
USACE contracting organization and structure created to execute and administer the 
construction portion of the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly in 
terms of sustaining an all-volunteer civilian contracting workforce. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary Research Question:  How are the USACE and the new, GRD/AED 
structured to accomplish the Iraq and Afghanistan contracting missions; and to what 
extent are the on-going strategy, structure and processes accomplishing the mission?  
Subsidiary Questions: 
• Q1:  Does the current USACE contracting structure support contingency 
contracting? 
• Q2:  How can the process of using Army civilian contracting volunteers in 
Iraq/Afghanistan be described, and to what extent is the current process 
sustainable?   
• Q3:  What are likely affects of changing from a voluntary to a mandated 
deployment approach? 
• Q 4:  To what extent does an aging U.S. defense workforce affect GRD and 
Afghanistan Engineering District (AED) contracting missions over the next 
few years, and what are the expectations for sustaining current levels of U.S. 
contracting volunteers, and what are additional alternatives? 
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• Q 5:  To what extent has the USACE used outsourcing to accomplish needed 
contracting functions in Iraq and Afghanistan? 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The USACE contingency/expeditionary operations have expanded and 
accelerated leading to the creation of the USACE GRD/AED.  The GRD is responsible 
for completing the construction portion of the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund 
(IRRF) program, which allocated $18.4 billion to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure, damaged 
from years of neglect, sanctions, and war.  The AED has a similar mission to provide 
valuable engineering and construction services to support the development and execution 
of U.S. and international efforts to establish a secure and stable environment in 
Afghanistan.  The need for deployable and experienced civilian Army contracting 
personnel has soared, with voluntary tour-acceptance ranging from four-months to 
repeated deployments lasting several years in some cases.   
E. APPROPRIATE DATA 
The analysis of GAO reports, GRD’s Acquisition Plan, the Gansler Report, and 
various related publications will be used for background information and data.  The 
results from recent “market research” directed at the USACE acquisition workforce to 
determine what incentives would motivate civilians to volunteer for assignments with the 
USACE Gulf Region Division (GRD) will be analyzed.  Researches will use insight from 
the USACE Leaders in contracting that will focus on their concerns and 
recommendations for meeting the current demand for qualified contracting personnel. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This project examines various challenges facing the USACE in relation to the 
current contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.   
In Iraq, the USACE is working at improving the oil infrastructure, power supply, 
water resources infrastructure, hospitals, education, roads, and bridges – all the things 
needed to build a strong society.  In addition to its nation building efforts, the Corps also 
supports the military by constructing buildings and facilities.  The USACE has deployed 
over 3,000 personnel to these contingency environments since the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT) began; of which most are civilian volunteers that have served 
multiple tours.  According to division and district officials, the Corps' ability to maintain 
a workforce sufficient to accomplish its traditional mission is being affected by three key 
challenges.  These challenges are as follows: (1) intense competition from the private 
sector and other entities to hire the best talent; (2) the loss of staff to various contingency 
operations, such as Iraq and Afghanistan; and (3) the large number of employees who are 
eligible to retire. 
In the June 2008, Congressional Research Service (CSR) report, a report prepared 
for members and committees of Congress, states that over the past few years logistical 
support service contracts have grown in size, shape, and complexity.  While the 
complexity has increased, the size of the federal contracting workforce has decreased.  
There is now an imbalance – there are fewer federal contracting officials to manage the 
large-scale contracts.  As a result, the government has sought to hire contractors to do the 
job that federal employees used to perform.  Questions being addressed include the extent 
to which current demands, requirements, and expectations concerning civilian contracting 
personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan are being achieved, including the efficacy of using 
civilian volunteers to fulfill deployment needs.  
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This literature review draws from the following primary sources: 
• Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports and testimony 
• Open print news articles 
• Reports/studies from Congressional commissions/panels 
• Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy (OFPP) and applicable Executive Branch documents, and 
• Thesis studies from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and the Air Force 
Air War College  
B. AVERTING THE DOD CIVILIAN WORKFORCE CRISIS 
Following 11 consecutive years of downsizing, the government workforce faced 
serious imbalances in the skills and experience of its highly talented and specialized 
civilian workforce.  Further, 50 percent will be eligible to retire by 2005.  In some 
occupations, half of the current employees will be gone by 2006.  The situation worsens 
as experienced professionals continue to retire, while the contingency contracting 
“workload” continues to increase.  An additional troubling detail is that only about 6 
percent of the 178K DoD procurement workforce is active military.  
In 2001, Scott G. Schoeb of the U.S. Army War College conducted a Strategy 
Research Project titled “Averting the DoD Civilian Workforce Crisis.”  Schoeb used the 
Acquisition Task Force Report 2005 Final Report: “Shaping the Civilian Acquisition 
Workforce of the Future,” Oct 20001 as the basis of his study.  The reported revealed that 
for various reasons the DoD was faced with a substantial exodus of its acquisition civilian 
workforce over a 10-year period.  The report examined conditions associated with 
civilian losses and detailed actions necessary to enhance/augment recruitment and 
retention of certified and experienced acquisition personnel with the skill sets needed to 
accomplish national security objectives.  Schoeb pointed out that one of the primary tasks 
of the civilian workforce is the acquisition of general and highly specialized material 
needed to run the largest and most complex business entity in the world.   
                                                          
1 Acquisition Task Force 2005 Final Report: “Shaping the Civilian Acquisition Workforce of the 
Future, Oct 2000. 
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The Acquisition Task Force Report was prepared to analyze strategic concerns 
facing defense acquisition.  The report described a substantial age distribution change 
within the DoD civilian workforce.  Of concern, was the substantial number of DoD 
civilians due to retire in the next ten years.  Specific to the Army, the report gave 
statistical estimates that by 2010, 62 percent of the Army’s civilians will be fully eligible 
for retirement with an additional 26 percent qualified for early retirement.  The GAO 
report, DOD Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan,2 illustrated that in 2006, 
approximately 23 percent of the USACE workforce was eligible to retire, although on 
average, Corps employees retire 5.75 years after they are eligible.  A premise of this 
study is that the civilian contracting workforce remains essential to accomplishing 
national security objectives, particularly in the Iraq/Afghanistan theatres.   
C. ACQUISITION WORKFORCE 
In its Acquisition Workforce: Status of Agency Efforts to Address Future Need3  
study, GAO examined how six civilian agencies are addressing their future acquisition 
workforce needs.  Together these six agencies account for approximately 72 percent of 
civilian (non-military) federal contracting dollars spent on an annual basis.  The 
Department’s of Energy, Veterans Affairs (VA), and the General Services Administration 
are developing plans to strengthen their acquisition workforces.  The Department’s of 
Treasury, Health and Human Services, and the National Aeronautics Space 
Administration (NASA) are involving members of their acquisition workforce in their 
plans to manage human capital.  All are implementing new and/or strengthening existing 
career development and training programs.  GAO went on to say that, the agencies would 
face considerable challenges in terms of successfully formulating and implementing 
viable human capital strategies.  It was noted that most acquisition professionals would 
need to acquire a new set of skills focusing on business management.  Because the 
acquisition environment is more sophisticated, acquisition personnel can no longer just be 
                                                          
2 GAO-08-439R DOD Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan, May 2008. 
3 Acquisition Workforce: GAO-03-55, December 2002, Status of Agency Efforts to Address Future 
Needs (referenced throughout this section). 
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purchasers or process managers.  These professionals will now need to be skilled at 
examining business problems and assisting with developing strategies in the early stages 
of the acquisition.  With the frequent changes in budget, rules, regulations, and mission, 
agencies find it difficult to forecast the requirement for future workforce.  Many agencies 
simply do not have the needed data on their workforce, such as skills, knowledge, size, 
location, and retirement rates.  Such data is critical to planning future needs.  GAO stated 
that in their attempt to overcome these challenges, these agencies could learn from the 
DOD, which has made progress in acquisition workforce strategic planning and has 
addressed some of the same issues.  
GAO included the following DoD lessons learned in their study: (1) DoD officials 
understood that the strategic planning effort needed would take time and that effective 
leadership and guidance, along with technology and sound methodology, were required 
to accurately forecast workforce needs.  (2) DoD’s experience in strengthening its 
civilian acquisition workforce through workforce planning provides useful lessons 
learned that could benefit the aforementioned agencies.  (3) DoD has analyzed its current 
workforce and made projections for the future and recognized that implementing a 
strategic approach to reshaping the workforce involves substantial challenges.   
GAO also observed that though DoD has made progress in acquisition workforce 
strategic planning, it still must overcome cultural resistance to its strategic approach and 
build a solid foundation for planning.  DoD’s efforts to address its challenges include the 
following: (1) a sustained commitment by managers is needed due to the amount of time 
strategic planning takes; (2) accurate and accessible data must be available to carry out 
workforce analyses; (3) planning must be carried out at the appropriate level of the 
organization; (4) organizations must have the right tools to make projections about the 
workforce and the training needed to properly use the tools; and (5) when planning is to 
be performed at lower organizational levels, managers must support the effort which 
clearly identifies strategic and performance goals and have the authority they need for the 




barriers included ad hoc policy decisions, cultural resistance to workforce planning, 
limited strategic workforce planning expertise, and the lack of an institutional structure to 
support strategic workforce planning.   
GAO noted that in 2001, DoD created the Acquisition 2005 Task Force to 
develop a plan to rebuild its acquisition workforce.  The Task Force made several 
recommendations that DoD had begun implementing as of the date of the GAO report.  
One of the primary recommendations was to develop and implement a human capital 
strategic plan for the civilian acquisition workforce.4  According to DoD, the first cycle 
highlighted the key planning barriers that needed to be overcome.  This provided valuable 
experience for future planning and implementation of developed strategies.  The DoD 
estimated that it would take as long as five years to mature the human capital strategic 
planning process.   
D. URGENT REFORM REQUIRED (THE GANSLER REPORT) 
Challenges to the U.S. Army’s career Acquisition workforce in an expeditionary 
environment – an analysis of the Gansler report of the “Commission on Army 
Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations” dated 31, 2007 
(hereinafter titled the “Report”).   
The Commission made four overarching recommendations5 to ensure the success 
of future expeditionary operations: (1) increase the stature, quantity, and career 
development of military and civilian contracting personnel, particularly for expeditionary 
operations; (2) restructure organization and restore responsibility to facilitate contracting 
and contract management; (3) provide training and tools for overall contracting activities 
in expeditionary operations; and (4) obtain legislative, regulatory, and policy assistance 
to enable contracting effectiveness in expeditionary operations. 
 
                                                          
4 The Acquisition 2005 Task Force Final Report - Shaping the Civilian Acquisition Workforce of the 
Future  (October 11, 2000). 
5 Testimony of John J. Young, Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, 
before the U.S. House Committee on Armed Services, April 10, 2008. 
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The Report recognized that the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Armed 
Services have made significant changes to adapting and meeting expected challenges to 
contracting since the end of the Cold War.  While shifting from the old “Institutional 
Army”6 model to a more modern “Operational Army” model, the Army acquisition 
workforce has found itself stretched thin with ongoing operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the seven-fold increase in contract actions since the events of 9/11, changes in 
technology, and the heavy reliance on contractors to provide essential services.  The 
Army has adapted to these demands by moving to a value-based procurement system.”7  
The Report commented that the Army’s largest population of contracting 
expertise are civilians, therefore the Army needs to provide incentives, be honest and 
upfront with civilians about the assignment and conditions, and treat them with respect 
equal to that given to military personnel.  Additionally, civilian contracting personnel 
who deploy for expeditionary contracting are undervalued, inadequately compensated; 
require additional education and training, more career opportunities and other 
occupational incentives.  According to the Report a complete review and rewrite of each 
applicable directive impacting civilian personnel involvement in military operations 
should be accomplished to include such topics as the following: 1) Law of Warfare (can 
civilians be armed?) and Geneva Convention; 2) conditions under which civilians will 
receive benefits of POW/MIA; 3) conditions under which civilians will receive medical 
treatment for life; and 4) conditions under which civilians will receive disability 
pensions. 
The Report goes on to say that in order to properly plan, synchronize operations, 
and manage the supply chain, it is essential that commanders be given timely situational 
awareness of contracts and contractor personnel and assets on the battlefield.  Contracting 
personnel sent into a theater of operations need to be highly skilled, adequately trained, 
                                                          
6 The Institutional Army supports the Operational Army. Institutional organizations provide the 
infrastructure necessary to raise, train, equip, deploy, and ensure the readiness of all Army forces. 
7 With value-based procurement, the impetus falls on suppliers.  Key suppliers relinquish their roles as 
disinterested bystanders — merely delivering traditional design-and-build products or services — to 
become full-solution providers.  In the private sector, this means manufacturers take responsibility for 
assembly and large-scale integration, and all other roles go to a few key partners. 
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and prepared for the assignment.  Along with the training, tools and experience needed, 
expeditionary contracting personnel need to be on the ground in theater where they can 
interface and interact with their customer in order to better support the warfighter.  
Operational commanders need training emphasizing the important role contracting plays, 
as well as their responsibilities in the process.   
The Report concludes that the Army needs to recognize the significance of 
contracts and contractors in an expeditionary environment and educate operational 
commanders on the important role of expeditionary contracting.  Not doing so has 
resulted in major errors in judgment that caused cost over-runs, bad requirements, and 
fraud.  Of all the forces operating in the theaters, the Army has the highest case of fraud.  
This signifies that the Army needs to provide better training for its contracting officers.  
Only 38 percent of the Army contracting workforce in-theater is certified for the 
positions held; and, overall, Army a significant number of contracting people are not 
certified for the position occupied.  Of the percent authorized, the Army fills only 80 
percent of the civilian contracting billets.   
The Report attempted to clarify the current state of expeditionary contracting, the 
challenges now facing it and provide recommendations for creating a strong 
expeditionary contracting force of both military and civilian professionals.  The Report 
recommends for the Army to have an effective strategy it needs to adequately fund 
career-planning programs, expand education and training, explore promotion potential, 
and develop contracting internships.   
E.  THE CORPS AT A CROSS ROAD 
Dan McGraw’s, article “The Corps at a Cross Road” 8outlines recent challenges 
the USACE is facing.  McGraw explains that the USACE is currently dealing with 
expanding military duties by functioning as the lead agency in awarding contracts for the 
reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan.  These duties include restoring the power grid, 
                                                          
8 McGraw, Dan "Corps at a cross road, The ASEE Prism.”  October 2003, on-line, Internet, August 16, 
2008, available from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3797/is_200310/ai_n9313164. 
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rebuilding bridges and roadways, constructing barracks and other infrastructure to service 
the troops, and to restore pipelines and port facilities.  The USACE is accomplish is 
accomplishing all of these activities under the constant threat of suicide bombers and 
sabotage.  McGraw goes on to say that the Corps’ is playing out its military functions at 
home as well.  With the Corps' duties including protecting the nation's water supply, the 
USACE finds itself devoting more and more resources to prevent biological and chemical 
terrorist attacks at many reservoirs.  
McGraw sites the Corps' budget at approximately $15.2 billion a year.  About 60 
percent of the budget goes to military construction.  The Corps executed about 70 percent 
of its total budget on contracts with private corporations.  The Corps civilian acquisition 
workforce awarded and managed these contracts.  In 2004, the Bush administration cut 
the USACE budget by about 10 percent, affecting mostly the civil works side of its 
mission. 
The article also highlighted concerns about the Corps aging workforce.  McGraw 
estimated that about one third of the USACE 35,000 employees would be eligible for 
retirement in the next decade.  According to article, the Corps leadership is worried that 
decades of expertise and "agency memory" will be lost with the coming retirements.  The 
concern has led the Corps to collaborate with several universities, which have provided 
engineering professors, to assist the Corps in looking at new directions for the future.  
The thrust of the program is to help address technical dimensions of the Corps as well as 
addressing the number of senior people retiring. 
F.  THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT: THE WAY FORWARD – A NEW 
APPROACH 
The Iraq Study Group Report is the report of the Iraq Study Group (ISG) that 
Congress appointed to assess the state of the Iraq war.  James Baker and Lee Hamilton 
led the group.  The ISC finalized and released the report on December 6, 2006.  The ISC 
report focused on military, diplomatic, and economic concerns.  It identified flaws in 
current approach to the conflict and made several recommendations that the ISG believed 
would chart a new course for success in Iraq.  
  11
The focus of the ISG report is not directly related to the scope of this research, 
however, one of its recommendations could have implications for the acquisition 
community.  In its recommendation #74, the ISG recommended that civilian agencies fill 
key positions in Iraq with direct assignment if no enough civilians volunteered.  As a part 
of this recommendation, the ISG recommended that steps be taken to mitigate financial 
hardships posed by directed assignments, including tax exclusions similar to those 
authorized for U.S. military personnel serving in Iraq. 
G. USACE EMPLOYEE FEEDBACK, METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE 
In December 2007, the Deputy Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting 
(PARC) Dallas for the USACE, sent an e-mail to all contracting personnel within the 
USACE asking, “What would motive you to volunteer?”  Specifically, the Deputy PARC 
was doing market research for a proposed USACE Contingency Contracting Cadre that 
would provide a pool of contracting professionals to the Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT) and the Emergency missions associated with the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA).  Once feedback was received, the information was used 
for two main purposes.  The first purpose was to identify people who may be receptive to 
volunteering for expeditionary contracting positions, and secondly, to describe common 
trends among the respondents.  Two of the authors of this project were among the 
respondents to this informal request for information by the Deputy PARC, and pursued 
communications with those involved with reviewing responses.  These conversations 
provided some insight to the various perspectives within the USACE contracting 
workforce, and helped direct some of the areas that were researched further.  The 
researchers had no direct or indirect contact with the respondents, nor were any specific 
information about respondents discussed.  Rather the general interpretations of these 
responses were communicated.  Overall, five major issues were identified, and are 
presented in Chapter IV of this paper as supporting data for the recommendation for 








The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is the world’s largest public 
engineering, design, and construction management agency.  The Corps’ mission is to 
provide vital engineering services and capabilities to support a wide range of federal civil 
works and military programs throughout the United States and to support U.S. missions 
overseas.  The civil works program includes activities related to, among other things, 
flood damage reduction, environmental stewardship, and ecosystem restoration, while the 
military program includes military design and construction, real estate management, and 
international and interagency services.  In addition to its headquarters office in 
Washington, D.C., the Corps has eight division offices, 41 district offices, and two 
centers.  This does not include the newly formed GRD, and AED.   
To accomplish its work, the Corps relies on a workforce of approximately 
35,0009, which includes biologists, engineers, geologists, hydrologists, natural resource 
managers, contracting, and other professionals.  In addition to its historical mission, since 
the 1990s, the Corps’ priorities have shifted to include an increased focus on supporting 
contingency/expeditionary operations, such as addressing terrorism and responding to 
natural disasters.  This shift in priorities is placing new demands on the agency’s 
workforce, such as supporting hurricane recovery like Charlie in 2004 and Katrina in 
2005 as well as the clean up for 9/11 and the support for the Global War on Terrorism.  In 
response to these events, the Corps has deployed unprecedented numbers of civilian 
contracting personnel.  All of these contracting professionals were volunteers who have 
made personal sacrifices to support contingencies at home and abroad.   
B. GULF REGION DIVISION STRUCTURE 
The United States, along with its coalition partners and various international 
organizations and donors, has embarked on a significant effort to rebuild Iraq and 
                                                          
9 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Home page http://www.usace.army.mil/who/. 
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Afghanistan.  The United States is spending billions of dollars on this reconstruction 
effort while combating an insurgency that has targeted military and contractor personnel 
and the Iraqi people.10  The United States, through USACE and others, has relied heavily 
on private-sector contractors to provide the goods and services needed to support both the 
military and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
In its support of the contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Corps 
established the Gulf Regional Division (GRD) and the Afghanistan Engineering District 
(AED).  The GRD, was activated on 25 January 2004, in Baghdad, Iraq.  Three districts 
(North, in Tikrit; South, in Tallil; and Central in Baghdad) were organized 
simultaneously with the Division.  This new organization consolidated the different 
USACE activities operating in Iraq under one command, creating a sustainable, 
supportable engineer presence.  The GRD initial mission was to support military 
construction and, later, to be the construction management component.   
The three districts have a combined twenty-nine contingency contracting 
specialist positions to execute the GRD mission.11  These contracting professionals are 
responsible for all construction projects, which include renovation and construction of 
hospitals, primary healthcare facilities, municipal buildings, water and wastewater 
treatment facilities, police stations, border forts, courthouses and prisons, electrical power 
generation, transmission, and distribution systems, roads, seaports and airports.  As of 
August 2008, the GRD had awarded more than $7.2 billion in reconstruction projects. 
The mission in Afghanistan is practically the same, but on a smaller scale.  Since 
2002, the AED has awarded nearly $3.5 billion in construction contracts for projects that 
support security forces, the Afghan military, national police, U.S./Coalition Forces, 
counter narcotics, border management, and strategic construction.  AED will manage 
more than $2 billion in construction projects in FY08.  AED has seven contracting 
positions to manage and execute reconstruction projects.  These individuals are 
                                                          
10 GAO-06-1132, September 2006, Iraq Contract Costs: DOD Consideration of Defense Contract 
Audit Agency's Findings. 
11 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers – A Brief History, 
http://www.grd.usace.army.mil/divisioninfo/history.asp. 
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responsible for overseeing the work of hundreds of contractors who in turn employ 
thousands of workers with the majority being Afghan citizens.  The number of Afghan 
citizens working on Corps projects will vary according to the life cycle of the 
construction projects.  During the peak construction season the number has gotten as high 
as 16,000.  Managing contracts for such a workforce requires an adequate staff of well-
trained contracting officers and specialists, who the Corps has struggled to maintain.  
C. VOLUNTEERS 
Civilian volunteers are at the heart of the USACE mission in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  Without active duty military cadre to support the recovery efforts in the 
war zones of Iraq and Afghanistan the USACE relies totally on civilian volunteers of 
several disciplines to meet these critical missions.  The districts of the Gulf Region and 
Afghanistan are doing a tremendous amount of work with the workforce on hand but the 
shortage of skilled individuals to execute contracts and oversee contractors’ performance 
has created some significant challenges.  The need to maintain an adequate team of 
qualified volunteer contract specialists and contracting officers is especially critical.  The 
USACE has found it extremely difficult to persuade enough contract specialists to 
volunteer for these duties.  Some of the major problems USACE is experiencing are: (1) a 
lack of meaningful incentives to compel individuals to volunteer; (2) a shrinking 
workforce nationwide for the past several years; and (3) a current lack of contract 
specialists within the federal acquisition workforce.12  These areas will be explored 
further within various areas of this paper.   
D. RECRUITING AND RETENTION  
Recruiting and retaining new contracting specialists has become very difficult due 
to the downsizing of the acquisition workforce in the ‘90s and the aging of the entire 
workforce in the country.  Throughout its 41 Districts, and two Centers, the USACE is 
authorized 1,200 full time contracting specialists; however, current staffing is only 900.  
                                                          
12 Congressional Budget Office Report: The All-Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance, dated 
July 2007. 
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This equates to a 25 percent vacancy rate, which has been seemingly impossible to erase.  
For example, the districts of the South Atlantic Division (SAD) have seen a constant flow 
of contract specialists departing for promotions and other unspecified reasons.  They have 
moved on to other divisions within the USACE, other agencies within the federal 
government as well as other municipalities and private sector businesses.  These loses 
have left most SAD districts with open contracting slots that have been difficult to fill.  
The Savannah District, the largest military district in the South Atlantic Division, has 
been working unsuccessfully for months to fill more than 10 much needed positions.  
With an enormous workload fueled by the Army transformation and Defense Base 
Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC), Savannah’s contracting workforce has 
logged huge amounts of overtime to manage the workload.  The struggle to recruit and 
retain adequate staffing to meet its mission has also placed a strain on encouraging those 
who otherwise would be compelled to volunteer for deployments to Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  
Other agencies are also experiencing the pain of recruiting and retaining an 
adequate contracting staff.  In a recent GAO report13, GAO noted that the Army 
Contracting Center of Excellence, which also executes a huge contingency workload, was 
having trouble recruiting and retaining qualified contract specialists.  An official told 
GAO that the agency had 10 contract specialist positions that have been vacant for as 
long as five months, as well as another 12 vacancies such as procurement analysts and 
cost/price analysts.  According to the report, from August 2006 through August 2007, 24 
contract specialists, more than one-quarter of its government-contracting workforce, 
during the period left the agency.  Agency officials stated that some of these personnel 
retired, but many had gone to work for private contractors that support the federal 
government.  These factors are important because shortages in contracting in federal 
agencies throughout the country and around the world have lead to a crisis that directly 
affects the USACE’s ability to staff and execute its mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
                                                          
13 GAO-08-360 DEFENSE CONTRACTING, Army Case Study Delineates Concerns with Use of 
Contractors as Contract Specialists, March 2008. 
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E. CHALLENGES 
Although the USACE contracting teams in Iraq and Afghanistan have performed 
admirably and have had numerous success stories,14, the shortage of contracting 
personnel has caused some major challenges to the operations of both the GRD and the 
AED.  Some of the successes are visible in the completion of more than 4,134 projects at 
a total construction cost of $6.1 billion.  A few of these success stories include the 
Nassriya and Erbil City-Ifraz water supply projects that are now providing potable water 
to more than 880,000 people.  The Kirkuk Substation and Qudas electric plant expansion 
that generated enough power to service nearly 235,000 homes is another success story, as 
well as the Basrah Children’s Hospital that offers state-of-the-art facilities and equipment 
with a focus on pediatric oncology.  In the oil industry, the USACE has completed more 
than 116 projects that have raised oil production to more than 3 millions barrels per day 
while accomplishing the per day production of natural gas of 800 million standard cubic 
feet.  The USACE has also performed 112 railroad renovation projects, 25 aviation 
project, including eight airport improvements, and over 1300 health and education 
facilities.   
Beyond these success stories, however, there have been some failures such as the 
Al Fatah River Pipeline Crossing, which failed because of subsurface geologic 
conditions, which made it impossible to retain open boreholes for large diameter 
pipelines.  Warnings of these conditions were highlighted in a consultant’s desktop study 
before the project was awarded.  The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 
(SIGIR)15 ascribed the failure to a flawed construction design, a management structure 
that impeded communications, and inadequate oversight by the USACE.  The failure to 
complete this project may have been instrumental in losing more than $1.5 billion in 
potential oil revenues critical to the Iraqi government.  Additionally, the Relief and 
Reconstruction work at the Mosul Dam experienced numerous problems, which led to 
                                                          
14 The facts stated are taken from the GRD web site www.grd.usace.army.mil contained in the Essay 
on Forward newsletter and reconstruction fact sheets. 
15 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction; Al Fatah Pipe River Crossing in Fatah, Iraq: 
SIGIR PA-05-010, March 7, 2006. 
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poor quality of work and wasted resources.  More than $19.4 Million was spent on 
equipment and material for grouting operations, however, this equipment did not provide 
the benefits expected, and may have been a waste of money.  It was also noted that 
several contractors’ invoices lacked supporting details for material and equipment 
demonstrating a lack of oversight by the contracting officer.  The Baghdad Police College 
constructed by Parson, Inc., for a total of $72.2 Million had numerous deficiencies.  The 
contractor did not provide the government design drawings for review nor did the 
government review daily quality control reports and was unaware of significant 
deficiencies, including poor plumbing, expansion cracks and exposed rebar.  These are 
but a few contracts with major deficiencies that were directly or indirectly a result of 
insufficient oversight by the contracting officer.  
F. SUMMARY 
Beyond its mission at home as the world’s largest public engineering, design, and 
construction management agency, the USACE involvement in the Relief and 
Reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan is vital to the U.S. national security.  In its 
support of the contingency operations in these countries, the USACE established the Gulf 
Region Division and the Afghanistan District to carry out its assigned mission.  These 
offices are mainly staffed by civilian volunteers who execute hundreds of projects in the 
rebuilding efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Recruiting and retaining volunteer contracting 
specialists is a huge challenge for the USACE as its acquisition workforce becomes older 
and struggles with recruitment of new people to enter federal employment.  The shortage 
of contracting personnel has caused some major challenges to executing and 
administrating contracts. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE USACE EMPLOYEE FEEDBACK 
A. BACKGROUND 
Two of the researches for this project are part of the USACE contracting 
workforce and over the past four years, we have seen various methods used to motivate 
us to volunteer for deployments to operations in Iraq and/or Afghanistan.  An appeal to 
our sense of duty is the most common approach.  A recent e-mail from the USACE 
commander started with “I am extremely proud of the way you have answered the call in 
Iraq and Afghanistan...a critical priority for the Corps!  You are impacting them in a 
positive way and helping make a better life for the people and their children.”  This has 
become a topic at every quarterly town hall meeting, organized district function, and 
employee newsletter.  Although many people have chosen to volunteer, the USACE 
command still struggles to fill critical positions in the GRD and the AED.  A logical 
question to ask is why some people volunteer, and others do not.  By looking at limiting 
factors that are prevent people from volunteering, the USACE leadership can address 
concerns and develop meaningful incentive programs. 
As market research conducted by the USACE PARC Dallas and the USACE 
PARC Winchester, for a newly proposed USACE Contingency Contracting Cadre, 
contracting personnel provided feedback as to what it would take to entice them to 
volunteer for a contingency contracting assignment.  The majority of the responses fell 
into one of five major categories.  Researches used these five categories as talking points 
while discussing the issue with contract specialists, contracting officers, administrative 
contracting officers, and various leaders within the USACE.  These five general 
categories are discussed below. 
B. FINDINGS 
The Responses from contracting personnel are grouped into one of five major 
categories.  Three of the categories are barriers to volunteering.  Those being a perception 
that volunteering could be detrimental to ones career, anxiety about not being properly 
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trained, and worry over family while away.  The final two categories are considered areas 
that motivate people to volunteer.  These are financial incentives, and a desire to 
contribute to a worthwhile cause.  Of some surprise was the lack of concern over ones 
personal safety.  
The first barrier is concern about repercussion if employees leave their current 
jobs to volunteer for assignments within GRD or AED.  As mentioned earlier, districts 
are currently understaffed, and management is not always pleased about losing valuable 
resources to long deployments.  Employees worry that while Headquarters encourages 
them to volunteer, their first line supervisor may resent their leaving.  Brigadier General 
Joseph Schroedel, Commander, USACE South Atlantic Division, in a recent e-mail 
message made reference to individuals being denied the opportunity to deploy by their 
supervisor.  He wrote, “ONLY the Secretary of Defense has the authority to deny anyone 
from volunteering.  I hold all leaders accountable for supporting an individual's desire to 
deploy.  Further, I expect any individual who is being denied the opportunity to deploy to 
let your District Engineer and - or me know personally!!  Supporting the GWOT is still 
our top priority!!”   
A related problem is that volunteers may miss opportunities for advancement 
while they are deployed.  This is a complicated problem, which causes great concern for 
employees.  If employees believe by volunteering for deployment that they are in fact 
making a poor career move, it is unlikely they can be convinced otherwise.  
Another common response was that potential volunteers wanted to receive proper 
training prior to being deployed.  There were concerns about not knowing enough about 
contingency contracting and how it might differ from their normal contracting 
experience.  Generally, people want to be well prepared in order to do a good job once 
they arrive at a new duty station; thus avoid walking into a situation in which they are not 
prepared to handle.    
Although contracting personnel often attend the Defense Acquisition University 
(DAU) Contingency Contracting course, CON 234, prior to taking a contingency 
assignment, even DAU recognizes the need for expanding this course to include recent 
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lessons learned.  At the 2008 Army Procuring Contracting Officer and Intern Training 
Symposium, a briefing by Leonardo Manning, Director, Center for Contracting, DAU 
Stafford, VA, outlined DAU’s response to recommendations from the Gansler 
Commission.  In brief, DAU has created a Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook, and 
redesigned DAU’s contingency contracting curriculum to train a journeyman-level 
contingency contracting officer, with the necessary experience, to be deployable and 
immediately effective upon arrival to support the mission.  DAU is currently 
standardizing the block of contracting courses that will fully train and qualify 
contingency contracting officers.  DAU is also developing an advanced Contingency 
Contracting Course to provide “just in time” training to senior-level contracting 
personnel deploying to a management position.  DAU is also working on a multi-day 
joint contingency “immersion experience” that will incorporate interactive computer 
simulation with increased hands-on applications  
The briefing identified the following ten courses as the block of contracting 
courses for contingency contracting officers. 
• CON 100 - Shaping Smart Business Arrangements 
• CON 110 - Mission Support Planning 
• CON 111 - Mission Planning Execution 
• CON 112 - Mission Performance Assessment 
• CON 120 - Contracting for Mission Support 
• CON 234 - Joint Contingency Contracting 
• CON 237 - Simplified Acquisition Procedures 
• ACQ 101 - Fundamentals of System Acquisition Mgt 
• CLC 033 - Contract Structure & Format 
• CON 244 - Construction Contracting (Optional) 
While researchers, of this paper, support the idea of updated DAU course work, it 
is unclear if this training will be enough to prepare the USACE contracting personnel for 
expeditionary contracting currently done in GRD and AED.  Further analysis of DAU 
curriculum is needed to determine if a gap exists.  It may be necessary for the USACE to 
sublimit DAU courses with specific training of their own. 
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The desire for proper training is encouraging.  It implies that if the USACE 
commits to training people they are more likely to volunteer.  It also shows that people 
want to be prepared so that they can perform their jobs with high proficiency  
Some respondents said they have considered deployment, but that the care of their 
family back home was a concern.  Family care plans for soldiers deploying to 
contingency environments are standard and give a sense of relief to the soldier knowing 
that there is a safety net for their children (if single of if dual military) or their elderly 
parents where they are the primary care giver.  Many in the civilian workforce are single 
parents and/or the primary caregiver to their elderly parents, but are not required to 
develop any type of plan in advance.  The USACE is currently developing family 
programs to address these issues.  The plan is to hire ten community support 
coordinators, who will be located in division offices and build support networks for the 
families of deployed civilians.  It may be useful for these coordinators to use the Active 
Duty Family Support Plan as a model.  
Respondents mention financial incentives most often as motivators for 
volunteering.  This may be because the market research e-mail specifically asked, “Is 
there a percentage amount that would motivate you to volunteer to serve in this 
program?”  Regardless of the reason, the responses do provide a guideline for setting 
incentive thresholds.  Bonus and pay caps were discussed, and most people said they 
would consider volunteering for 15 percent of their base salary for short deployments and 
20 percent for longer deployments.  Financial incentives are not new, but the threshold at 
which people could start to consider volunteering is new and potentially valuable 
information for the USACE.  
Personal satisfaction was also a common response.  Respondents wanted to know 
that they would be doing meaningful work, and that they would really make a difference.  
Employees described a sense of patriotism, and a desire to be part of an American effort.  
Respondents voiced a concern that they would not be doing “real” contracting, but rather 
used as a clerk doing paperwork.  In other words, before civilians commit to a cause, they 
need assurances that their personal sacrifice will make a difference.  They need to know 
their technical skills will be used appropriately, and that they will be contributing to the 
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overall success of the mission.  One comment from a leader within the USACE, indicated 
if we are sent over to Iraq or Afghanistan so we can do what we do best, construction 
contracts, but are pulled off that duty to purchase supplies for the command, it is 
diverting our specialized resources.  We are forced to work in areas that should be 
handled by the agencies like Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) or Army 
Contracting Agency (ACA) that typically do not do construction contracting. 
C. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING CADRE 
While Engineering, Project Management, and Construction Divisions have taken 
different approaches to fill expeditionary positions, some within the USACE contracting 
community have proposed a USACE Contingency Contracting Cadre (UCCC) of 1102s.  
The UCCC mission would be to provide contracting assets to both the GWOT and the 
Emergency missions associated with FEMA support.  The recommendation is to combine 
all expeditionary contracting requirements into one cadre of volunteers.  Under the 
current structure, GWOT and FEMA, while pulling from the same pool of potential 
volunteers, are organized separately, and their staffing processes differ.  The staffing 
process for GRD and AED, which support the GWOT, is discussed later in this paper.  
The FEMA support teams are discussed below. 
The USACE has established Planning and Response Teams (PRTs) that work as 
support to FEMA.16  The PRTs support the following six emergency missions National 
Ice, National Water, Emergency Power, Temporary Roofing, Temporary Housing, and 
Debris Removal.  Each USACE Division is responsible for identifying a designated 
number of volunteers that serve on one of the six Emergency Missions through PRT’s.  
PRT’s are staffed by volunteers from a variety of functional areas including contracting.  
These teams require a total of 85 contracting volunteers.  Other members of the PRT’s 
include all necessary functional areas filled by personnel appropriate to the mission.  
These functional areas include Engineering, Construction, Logistics, and Project 
                                                          
16 Public Law 84-99 (33 U.S.C. 701) authorizes the USACE to provide emergency response/disaster 
assistance.  Federal Response Plan (Stafford Act), Emergency Support Function #3 – Public Works and 
Engineering authorizes the USACE to respond and provide recovery assistance to state and local customers 
that is beyond their capabilities. 
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Management.  PRT members train together throughout the year and share experiences 
each time they activated to support FEMA.  With training and actual work, team 
members become familiar with each other, and the team becomes more effective.   
The requirements for membership in the UCCC would include a signed 
agreement, which would be effective for three years and with agreement of all parties, 
could be extended on an annual basis thereafter.  Members would need to maintain 
medical, dental, physical fitness and immunization requirements.  Defense Acquisition 
Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) certification at the appropriate level (dependent 
on grade) in the CP 14 Occupation Series would be necessary.  Members would maintain 
a performance rating of satisfactory or above.  Members would need supervisor’s 
approval prior to acceptance, and any disapproval that was based on workload 
considerations would be elevated to the Division level to see if resources could be found 
regionally or nationally.   
Similar to the PRT’s the UCCC concept would make each Division responsible 
for a designated number of Cadre members.  Once the UCCC membership was 
established, a rotation list for each Division would be maintained by the Central 
Management Office (CMO).  This list would be made available to members of the Cadre 
within each region.  The rotation list would have three parts – those eligible/willing to 
deploy for both a PRT and GWOT, those willing to deploy to GWOT only, and those 
only eligible/willing to deploy with a PRT.  The rotation list for GWOT would be 
established by a name draw within each region to ensure fairness to each member.  The 
first person drawn would assume the top position on the list.  Once a person from the top 
of the list deploys, they would move to the bottom of the list.  As new members join each 
year, a name draw will take place among the new members and they will assume the 
positions above the last person deployed from the previous list.  Members must be 
willing to deploy with short notice, less than 30 days notice GWOT and six hours notice 
for PRT.  
As seen with the results of the survey, financial incentives would be a factor in 
getting the right people to join the UCCC.  Because of certain civilian personnel 
regulations, pay incentives are not always possible.  Final incentives are still being 
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explored, but it appears waivers and/or changes to current regulations may be necessary 
to implement the proposed financial enticements outlined below: 
• Cadre members would receive an annual retention incentive of five percent of 
the base pay to be paid out with biweekly pay. 
• Foreign Post Differential (FPD) normally begins on the 43rd day of 
deployment and is retroactive in Iraq and Afghanistan.  FPD can be up to 35 
percent of a members basic pay. 
• Danger Pay, as determined by the SECSTATE, can be up to 35 percent of the 
member’s basic pay and begins on the first day in theater. 
• The USACE also pays a relocation incentive of 15 percent of a person’s base 
salary when they volunteer for a six-month deployment and 25 percent for a 
one-year deployment. 
• There is a pay cap for civilian employees; however, the USACE plans to 
process a waiver for all Cadre deployments.  Once waived, the pay cap would 
be equal to the annual pay of a GS-15, Step 10, or approximately $186,600 
per year.  
• Annual leave forfeited by an employee because of service in a combat zone 
would be automatically restored.  Cadre members would have two years to 
use restored annual leave. 
The USACE PRTs are structured so that prior to an actual need, teams are 
identified, and trained.  PRTs are “activated” and moved into place to execute the 
mission.  Additional volunteers may be required as back up, but the initial activation is 
accomplished with pre-event volunteer team members.  The proposed UCCC would use 
this concept and take it one step further by extending the scope of PRT’s response to 
emergency to a Cadre that would deploy for expeditionary operations.  The advantage to 
Cadre members, over the current PRT approach is the continuous financial incentives for 
remaining on call, and possible priority for various training.   
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V.  WORKFORCE ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The primary research question of this paper is: How is USACE and the new GRD 
and AED structured to accomplish the Iraq and Afghanistan contracting missions, and to 
what extend is the on-going strategy, structure, and processes accomplishing the mission?  
In order to answer this question, a workforce analysis was done by researches from this 
project, by answering subsidiary questions.  These questions address the current 
contracting structure, the process of using civilian volunteers, the option of mandating 
deployment, the effect of an aging workforce, and finally the possibility of outsourcing 
contracting functions.  Each question is addressed in more detail in the following 
paragraphs.  Overall recommendations in this paper to the USACE are drawn from the 
analysis of these questions and subsequent answers. 
B. CHANGES TO THE USACE CONTRACTING STRUCTURE 
How does the current USACE contracting structure support contingency 
contracting? 
To support GWOT the USACE has three Districts in the Gulf Region Division of 
Iraq, the North, South, and Central Districts and one District in Afghanistan; the 
Afghanistan Engineer District (AED).  GRD is authorized 29 contracting position and 
AED is authorized seven.  These offices are supported by reach back to contracting assets 
through the Transatlantic Program Center (TAC), in Winchester, VA.  The overall 
structure within GRD and AED is the same as with any District.  Contracting is run by a 
Chief who supervises a group of contracting officers who are team leaders for a team of 
contract specialists.  Contracting works very closely with personnel from Construction, 
Engineering, Project Management, Finance, Resource Management, and end users.  The 
majority of civilian personnel currently working at the GRD and/or the AED are 
volunteers from the 41 Corps Districts, and two centers, with the majority coming from 
the TAC.  Researchers learned that most are repeat volunteers.   
  28
The USACE operates under the concept of Project Deliver Teams (PDT).  These 
PDT’s are composed of representatives from all appropriate functional disciplines 
working together to build successful projects, identify and resolve issues, and make 
sound and timely recommendations to facilitate decision making.  Typical PDT members 
include, Contracting Officers, Administrative Contracting Officers, Contracting Officer’s 
Representatives, Quality Assurance Representatives, Project Managers, Project 
Engineers, Engineering, Resource Managers, Office of Council, and the Customer.  Early 
in the acquisition process the PDT are to work together towards a common goal.  
Experience shows that over time and with shared experiences, the PDT’s become better 
able to work effectively together.   
The model of group development, first proposed by Bruce Tuckman in 1965, tells 
us that in order for a team to grow, and become productive, it is necessary that four stages 
take place.  The stages are, forming, storming, norming, and performing.  The concept 
maintains that these stages are all necessary and inevitable in order for the team to face 
up to challenges, to tackle problems, to find solutions, to plan work, and to deliver 
results.  During the first stage, forming, the team spends time trying to figure out how to 
accomplish the tasks and little time actually doing tasks.  During the storming stage, the 
team begins to realize that the task at hand is different or more difficult than they had 
imagined.  Once the team reaches the norming stage, they reconcile competing loyalties 
and responsibilities.  The team develops spoken or unspoken rules on how to proceed.  
The last stage performing, team members work collaboratively to get the job done and 
solve problems. 
It is important to consider that while the USACE mission may be global, each 
District is unique in its approach, its personalities and in its processes.  The variety of 
backgrounds and experiences may be useful, however, within the expeditionary 
environment, assimilating to the current differences is critical.  This can more easily be 
achieved when team has already reached the norming stage.  Rather than have teams go 




perhaps a better idea would be to have pre-established teams that have trained together on 
a regular basis.  This would be similar to the USACE Emergency Management model of 
PRTs. 
C. PROCESS AND SUSTAINABILITY OF VOLUNTEERISM 
How can the process of using Army civilian contracting volunteers in 
Iraq/Afghanistan be described, and to what extent is the current process sustainable?   
The USACE Headquarters attempts to recruit contract specialists and contracting 
officers from its eight divisions in CONUS to fill the requirements in the theaters.  There 
are currently nineteen open job announcements for contract specialists and contracting 
officers.  When personnel are needed, a referral list is pulled and the most qualified 
applicants are interviewed.  As with any open job announcement, the delay between 
when an applicant applies and when they are contacted could be months.  For this reason, 
hiring officials stated that it is very common for the majority of the referrals to have 
changed their minds or already be in new positions when they are contacted for 
interviews.  This system has been effective enough to continue operations in theater 
without failure.  Contracts are being awarded and projects are being accomplished, 
however, success has not come without its drawbacks.  Contract specialists in the theater 
are working an enormous amount of overtime and there is limited oversight at the project 
sites.  To keep up with the workload, contracting personnel work six, twelve hours days, 
and one seven-hour day each week.   
The USACE command actively encourages civilians to volunteer for deployments 
to GRD and AED.  Sometimes the request is for specific skill sets, but most often, it is a 
general request for anyone currently working for the Corps.  It appears the recruitment 
tactics from the USACE Headquarters are generic in regards to filling vacancies of a 
particular job series.   
In a recent town hall meeting at the AED, Lieutenant General Robert L. Van 
Antwerp, the Chief of USACE, referenced contracting at the AED as “doing contracting 
on steroids.”  If this is an accurate analysis, then it is advisable for the USACE to focus 
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on getting the right people to volunteer for contingency contracting assignments.  After 
all, the idea of “contracting on steroids,” only appeals to a fraction of the workforce.  The 
USACE should create a profile of the type people needed, and work towards motivating 
these people with a campaign that speaks to them directly.  From our analysis, we 
contend these people would respond to specialized real world training, personal 
challenges, and ultimately mission accomplishment.   
D. VOLUNTARY TO MANDATED DEPLOYMENT  
What are likely affects of changing from a voluntary to a mandated deployment 
approach? 
Using civilian support staff for expeditionary operations is becoming increasingly 
common for the military.  With the continual growth of outsourcing of logistics support 
via service contracts, the requirement for contracting support for expeditionary operation 
has also increased tremendously.  Not only are contracting professionals needed to 
execute the award of contracts but also to participate in oversight of contractors who are 
performing the work.  Not only has the need for contingency contracting personnel 
increased, contracting personnel face an increasing workload, while performing more 
complex actions than ever before.  Despite this fact, the civilian and military contracting 
workforce is declining.  Currently the USACE uses a volunteer contracting workforce 
and a few military contracting personnel to provide for its contingency requirements.  
The USACE is finding it increasingly difficult to find volunteers to fill key requirements.  
The contracting situation is of such magnitude that it has some leaders calling for 
federal agencies to mandate civilian direct assignments in support of contingencies.  In 
their Iraq Study Group Report, James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton proposed that 
federal agencies supporting the Iraq war and reconstruction by ordering their civilian 
employees to fill key jobs in combat zones if not enough volunteers step forward.  The 
recommendation states, “In the short term, if not enough civilians volunteer to fill key 




Steps should be taken to mitigate familial or financial hardships posed by directed 
assignments, including tax exclusions similar to those authorized for U.S. military 
personnel serving in Iraq.”  
The recommendation grew out of a sense that civilian agencies are not 
contributing enough personnel to Iraq, adding to the burdens on the U.S. military.  The 
Baker/Hamilton report has some civilian workers and union alarmed at the idea of 
directed reassignments of civilian agency employees to a military war zone.  One union 
leader stated that the recommendation does little more than advocate a ‘draft’ for federal 
workers.  With the pushback from workers, unions and others, it is unclear what chance 
the report’s recommendations have of being adopted.  The State Department, however, 
facing the same personnel shortage dilemma, has issued a memo stating that employees 
either deploy to support contingencies, specifically Iraq, or risk being fired.17 
This move by the State Department may be a source of fuel for the debate in the 
DoD.  Even in the face of opposition from workers and their unions, however, Defense 
Department officials have recently said they may seek legislation or other measures to 
reduce institutional barriers to deploying civilians overseas, including to Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  Such an approach may have significant impacts on the workforce and 
further degrade the number of contracting employees, thus further affecting available for 
deployments. 
Some of the major challenges confronting the USACE acquisition workforce over 
the past decade are a shortage of qualified acquisition personnel, an ever-increasing 
workload, and more complex and detailed contract actions.  The Army Transformation 
and the latest round of Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC) have created an 
onslaught of military construction and major services requirements.  This has generated 
an overwhelming workload for the USACE that requires contracting of greater 
complexity.  This comes at the same time when the USACE is experiencing difficulties 
recruiting and retaining experienced acquisition personnel.  This situation has also 
affected the number of contract specialists available to support GRD and AED.  Many of 
                                                          
17 State Dept.: Go to Iraq or You’re Fired; CBS News Washington, October 26, 2007. 
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the USACE districts do not have enough contracting assets to accomplish their own 
mission.  Therefore, many supervisors discourage workers from volunteering for 
contingencies that will take them out of the office for six months or more.  Furthermore, 
when they are allowed to deploy, many of them lack the experience necessary to perform 
the complex acquisitions required.  Not having enough contracting resources forces the 
GRD and AED to operate under-staffed, making it difficult to meet the requirements of 
the mission effectively.  The USACE professionals are consistently faced with these 
challenges, causing some to migrate to the camp of those calling for mandating 
assignments to support contingency operations.   
The USACE currently provides civilian contracting specialists to support the 
contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan on a voluntary basis.  Due to shortfalls, however, 
the pressure is on to move to a mandate system where specialist will be direct assigned.  
The following are pros and cons of moving from a voluntary to a mandated system: 
Mandating civilian contracting rotation would provide the USACE with a better-
staffed, more knowledgeable, and better-equipped workforce in place to meet mission 
requirements.  The USACE would accomplish this by selecting individuals with the 
proper skill set to deploy.  In response to the Gansler Commission Report, the Army 
acquisition community is undergoing an enormous transformation in order to restructure 
how it handles all of its contracting actions.  These changes will also affect the USACE.  
The Gansler Commission Report to Congress indicated that urgent reform is required in 
Army expeditionary contracting.  One key recommendation of the report called for an 
“increase of the stature, quantity, and career development of military and civilian 
contracting personnel (especially for expeditionary operations)” (Gansler 5).  Lack of 
adequately trained contingency contracting officers and specialists has been found to be a 
contributing factor of waste, fraud, and abuse during the course of contracting operations 
in Afghanistan/Iraq.  In order to support its operations and the rebuilding of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the acquisition community must be able to procure the services and 
construction that will support our Warfighter as well as rebuilding these countries.  
Adding a contingency environment to contracting actions increases the need for highly 
trained personnel to carry out these rebuilding efforts.  One way to ensure that adequate 
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quantities of properly trained contingency acquisition personnel are available to support 
the USACE mission in expeditionary operations is to mandate rotational assignments for 
civilian contract specialists. 
Mandatory rotation of civilian contracting personnel would allow the Army to 
have immediate access to an adequately trained and professionally certified workforce.  
In accordance with DAWIA signed into law in November 1990, the Secretary of 
Defense, acting through the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics), is required to establish education and training standards, requirements, and 
courses for the civilian and military acquisition workforce.  Training for contingency 
contracting can be incorporated into the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement 
Act (DAWIA) curriculum and certification standards.  By doing so, the USACE will 
create a larger portion of its staff that will be able to support contingency operations.  
Once on the ground and in theatre, more civilians will be prepared to handle the 
contingency contracting environment.  Of the specialists currently in theatre, only a small 
percentage is properly trained in contingency contracting.  Mandating rotation for civilian 
contract specialists would allow more focus to be placed on providing continuous 
contingency contracting training The USACE would also have a more knowledgeable 
and better-equipped workforce in place to meet mission requirements.  Furthermore, 
contracting professionals will experience ‘hands-on’ training.  Oftentimes, ‘hands-on’ or 
‘on-the-job’ training is the best way in which people learn.  The real life, hands on, 
experience gained while supporting a contingency operation cannot be obtained in a 
classroom or a planning cell while in the comforts of one’s home station environment.  
Mandating civilian rotations will allow the USACE to have the resources to 
provide better oversight of projects in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Having the right people, 
with the right skills, in the right place overseeing contractor performance is crucial to 
ensuring that the USACE receives the best value products/services for the billions of 
dollars spent each year.  Contracting Officers are responsible for quality assurance, 




determine whether goods or services provided by the contractor satisfy the contract 
requirements and minimizes the risks that the government will pay the contractor more 
than the value of the goods and services.   
Some disadvantages to mandating civilian contracting personnel rotation to 
support reconstruction efforts are: mandating civilian rotations will place civilians in 
harms way against their will, many civilians are not physically fit, and it could lead to a 
mass exodus by contracting specialist, .   
Mandating civilian rotations will place civilians in harms way against their will.  
Generally, civilians do not sign up to go to work in war zones, nor are they trained for 
such conditions.  Current regulations governing DoD civilians in a contingency 
environment show that DoD lacks a comprehensive policy ensuring adequate protections.  
Most of the regulatory guidance dealing with DoD civilians accompanying the military 
was written prior to the War on Terror.  Current contingency operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan put DoD civilians at risk for kidnappings, torture, and murder by terrorists, 
criminal elements, and other insurgency forces. 
Many civilian employees are not physically fit to the level necessary to be 
successful in a contingency environment.  Unlike the military, civilians do not have a 
physical fitness standard.  Civilians are not required to be prepared for the physical 
challenges of war and therefore are at higher risk of physical and mental failure.  Initially, 
civilian positions were not created for the purpose of deployments, but to provide the 
necessary resources needed to support the Federal Government in military operations.  In 
addition, the most civilian workers come into the workforce for career opportunities that 
provide job security, benefits, and safe work environments.  
Mandating rotational assignments for civilian contract specialists could lead to a 
mass exodus from the USACE.  As noted in previous sections of this paper, the USACE 
is experiencing serious problems recruiting and retaining sufficient acquisition personnel 
to meet its mission at home.  Mandating assignments to Iraq and Afghanistan will be 
problematic and could cause workers to leave the USACE to avoid deployment.  
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Furthermore, hundreds of Baby Boomers that are eligible to retire may opt to retire 
earlier than planned instead of being forced into a dangerous situation.  
The voluntary system USACE currently uses is not working well and changes are 
needed.  The shortage of qualified contract specialist willing to deploy has lead to poor 
contracting practices, a lack of surveillance, and some shabby construction work.  The 
contracting situation is of such a magnitude that it has some leaders calling for federal 
agencies to mandate civilian direct assignments in support of these contingencies.  There 
are several areas that may be improved under a mandated system and the pros and cons 
that go along with these improvements.  However, the greatest of these issues it that such 
a system could lead to a mass exodus of an already scarce commodity, the contract 
specialist. 
E. IMPACT OF AGING WORKFORCE 
To what extent does an aging U.S. defense workforce affect Gulf Region Division 
(GRD) and Afghanistan Engineering District (AED) contracting mission over the next 
few years, i.e., what are the expectations for sustaining current levels of U.S. contracting 
volunteerism, and what are additional alternatives? 
The Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition workforce, including the Army 
Corps of Engineers (USACE), is facing a significant crisis with the imminent loss, 
through retirement and attrition, of a substantial portion of its experienced personnel.  
These key individuals are responsible for acquiring goods, services, and construction to 
meet the USACE mission.  It has been well documented that thousands of baby boomers, 
those born between 1946 and 1964, will be leaving the DoD workforce within the next 
few years, creating a huge breach in the acquisition corps that will be extremely difficult 
to fill.18  How did this happen?  Between 1989 and 1999, DoD downsized its civilian 
acquisition workforce by almost 50 percent.19 These reductions were the product of  
 
                                                          
18 The Gansler Report: Acquisition Workforce 2005 Task Force Report. 
19 ACQUISITION WORKFORCE: Department of Defense’s Plans to Address Workforce Size and 
Structure Challenges; GAO-02-630, April 2002. 
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several DoD measures such as acquisition reforms and base realignments and closures.  
At that time, DoD estimated that of the remaining workers as much as half will be 
eligible for retirement by 2005.   
The generations behind the baby boomers, generations X and Y, are smaller in 
number and will not be capable of replacing the boomers on a one for one basis.  
According to the Acquisition Technology &Logistic (AT&L) Human Capital Strategic 
Plan of 2007, within DoD workforce there are approximately 439,000 baby boomers, 
equating to 64.5 percent of the DoD workforce.  In contrast, the generation behind the 
boomers, Generation X, which are those born between 1965 and 1976, are approximately 
133,000 or 19.5 percent of the federal workforce, while Generation Y is roughly 63,000, 
making up approximately 9 percent of DoD.  As baby boomers retire, USACE, along 
with most federal agencies will be impacted negatively.  When considering the 
contracting workforce vacancy rate, it appears that aging affect has already impacted the 
USACE acquisition workforce.  
According to information obtained from USACE Headquarters, USACE is 
authorized 1200 contracting professionals but is currently manned at 900, carrying a 25 
percent vacancy rate.20 The aging crisis is most likely directly and indirectly impacting 
the Corps acquisition workforce and is indeed contributing to the shortfall.  This shortfall 
is affecting the USACE mission at home and in its support to contingencies.  This is 
especially critical when considering the important mission of reconstructing Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  USACE must be concerned to what extent an aging U.S. defense workforce 
will affect the Iraq and Afghanistan contracting missions over the next few years.  In 
other words, what are the expectations for sustaining current levels of contracting 
volunteers and what are additional alternatives? 
USACE should consider two ways the aging workforce may affect sustaining 
current levels of contracting volunteers in support of the Iraq and Afghanistan missions.  
First, there will not be as many contract specialists available for deployments.  The 
anticipated increase in retirements over the next few years will likely reduce the number 
                                                          
20 HQ USACE Contingency Contracting Cadre Briefing. 
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of contract specialists drastically.  The situation will create shortfalls at the district level, 
having a direct impact on meeting the district’s mission.  The table below, from the 2005 
Acquisition Workforce Study, shows the increase in retirement eligibility from 2005 to 
2015.  The number of contract specialists (GS-1102) eligible for retirement will increase 
from 13 percent in 2005 to an astonishing 54 percent in 2015.  The statistics for 
purchasing (1105) and procurement clerical and assistance (GS-1106) are even more 
profound at 62 percent and 64 percent respectively.  


























Population  23,937  27,589  526  666  3,098  2,370  1,291  59,477 
Average Grade  10.57  11.09  11.24  10.79  6.86  5.99  11.11  10.45  
Average Age  48.73  46.84  51.90  51.32  48.79  49.21  51.57  48.00  
Percent Female  56%  60%  51%  46%  75%  85%  29%  60%  
Percent Eligible 
To Retire*  15%  13%  31%  27%  18%  21%  34%  15%  
Percent Eligible 
To Retire FY 
2015*  
55%  54%  83%  79%  62%  64%  81%  57%  
Percent College 
Graduates  42%  69%  33%  17%  12%  9%  33%  51%  
Members, Senior 
Executive Service  108  74  0  0  0  0  0  182  
 
Secondly, USACE should consider that cultural pressure might hinder volunteers: 
The increased retirements, coupled with the retention struggles mentioned earlier, will 
create shortfalls at the district level, which will impact local mission accomplishments.  
In turn, the districts will be less enthused to encourage members to deploy - some may 
even discourage it.  Those who consider deploying may decide not to due to pressure 
from supervisors and peers.  Supervisors, already experiencing the impact from an under-
manned staff, would not want to see another valued employee leave for any reason, no 
matter how noble it may seem.  Coworkers already burdened with their own heavy 
                                                          
21 Federal Acquisition Institute Annual Report on the Federal Acquisition Workforce – FY 2005. 
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workload will not want to assume additional work from a deployed member’s desk.  This 
could cause some dissention in the ranks, which could lead to morale issues.  
Due to this anticipated increase in retirements, the expectation of sustaining 
current levels of contracting volunteers should be thoroughly examined.  The picture the 
numbers paint is not appealing, and the USACE must face the fact that huge losses in its 
acquisition workforce will have a negative impact on mission accomplishment.  As the 
baby boomers exit the workforce in droves, there will be few generation X and Y 
members to replace them.  The USACE must consider these factors in its human capital 
planning and develop strategies to minimize the impact of the aging workforce on its 
contingency/expeditionary mission. 
F. RESOURCING CONTRACTING FUNCTIONS 
To what extent has the USACE used outsourcing to accomplish needed 
contracting functions in Iraq and Afghanistan? 
The USACE is working to resolve, the many challenges to maintaining a strong 
acquisition workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, the leadership within the 
USACE has not outsourced any acquisition workforce responsibilities for these 
operations.  This paragraph will look at the overall effects of outsourcing acquisition 
personnel, and provide rationale for why this practice is not recommended. 
As previously noted there are many challenges to the federal acquisition 
workforce.  In order for them to keep up with the increased workload and complexity of 
contracts, federal agencies are turning more and more to outsourcing of acquisition 
personnel.  “Without a public debate or formal policy decision, contractors have become 
a virtual fourth branch of government.  On the rise for decades, spending on federal 
contracts has soared during the Bush administration, fueled by the war in Iraq, domestic 
security and Hurricane Katrina, but also by a philosophy that encourages outsourcing 
almost everything government does.”22  
                                                          
22 “US: In Washington, Contractors Take On Biggest Role Ever” by Scott Shane and Ron Nixon, The 
New York Times, 4 February 2007. 
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Service contracts are either personal service or non-personal service.  A personal 
services contract is characterized by the employer-employee relationship it creates 
between the government and the contractor’s personnel.  The government is normally 
required to obtain its employees by direct hire under competitive appointment or other 
procedures required by the civil service laws.  Obtaining personal services by contract, 
rather than by direct hire, circumvents those laws unless Congress has specifically 
authorized acquisition of the services by contract.  FAR 37.104(a).  Federal agencies shall 
not award personal service contracts unless specifically authorized by stature 
(e.g., 5 U.S.C.3109) to do so.  FAR 37.104(b).  Acquisition service contracts are 
considered non-personal in nature, and must be administered as such.  This may become 
difficult when contractors are working in the same location as government employees, 
are using government equipment, are performing the same work as government 
personnel, and require government direction or supervision.   
Studies of the Contracting Centers of Excellence (CCE)23 acquisition workforce 
shows where government managed leave for individual contractors.  This is just one 
example of many where government personnel are blurring the line between personal and 
non-personal services.  We believe that most of these violations were carried out for 
convenience, so that important matters could be addressed in a timely manner. 
Using contractors to support contracting missions can lead to questions regarding 
potential conflicts interest as well as those issues concerning whether or not they are 
performing a governmental or nongovernmental function.24  
Organization conflicts of interest are a consideration of outsourcing acquisition 
functions.  For example on June 12, 2006, the General Services Administration (GSA), 
responding to a shortage of trained personnel to oversee contracts and determine 
incompetence and fraud did what is becoming the government’s “reflexive answer to 
almost every problem”25 outsourced this position to a private contractor.  GSA’s 
                                                          
23 General Accounting Office, Highlights of GAO-08-360. 
24 2007 report to Congress, DOD's Panel on Contracting Integrity. 
25 “US: In Washington, Contractors Take On Biggest Role Ever” by Scott Shane and Ron Nixon, The 
New York Times 4 February 2007. 
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requirement was to hire six (6) contract specialists to review files and prepare proposed 
responses for review and signature.  However, documents obtained through the Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) by the Project on Government Oversight showed that the 
contractor ultimately became responsible for determining incompetence and/or fraud of 
their potential competitors, thus giving them a competitive advantage for any proposed 
future work the agency.  Additionally, a major U.S contractor, while performing under a 
government contract, had been accused by the government of writing parts of a statement 
of work for their own Iraq contract with the government.  They were ultimately cleared of 
charges and (at the time, the article referenced here “U.S.: In Washington, Contractors 
Take on Biggest Role Ever” was written) avoided a suspension from federal contracting.  
Even though the FAR26 states that contractors should have a written code of business 
ethics and conduct, there are no DoD policies requiring employees be free from conflicts 
of interest27.  There just are not enough safeguards in place to ensure that the advice and 
assistance contractor employees provide is not tainted by personal and/or organizational 
conflicts of interest.  
Another consideration when outsourcing acquisition functions is the disparity of 
pay within the multi-sector workforce.  It has been reported28 that the CCE is paying up 
to 27 percent more for its contractor provided contract specialists than for similarly 
graded government employees.  We believe resentment and strained working 
relationships will occur among the workforce when employees doing the same work, 
have such differences in salaries.   
We believe that the USACE sees the value in retaining a strong acquisition 
workforce made up of government personnel and is resisting outsourcing of its 
acquisition workforce in order to avoid the problems that are plaguing other government 
agencies.   
 
                                                          
26 FAR 9.505 
27 GAO-08-360 
28 GAO-08-360, March 2008 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This paper has addressed several USACE challenges related to maintaining an 
effective expeditionary contracting workforce in GRD and AED.  While some of these 
challenges have been addressed in recent studies, some are unique to the USACE, and 
require a more focused study.  The researchers present recommendations below to 
highlight their suggestions to meet the current need for the USACE expeditionary 
contracting in GRD and AED.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Recommendation #1 
The USACE should explore the concept of an ad hoc virtual Expeditionary 
Workforce to meet contingency needs as they arise with the built in ability to grow as 
missions evolve.  The expeditionary workforce would be comprised of volunteers from 
the USACE workforce.  When needed, these volunteers would be “activated” for 
expeditionary operations.  The expeditionary workforce, unlike the UCCC discussed 
earlier, would be structured like the USACE Emergency Management PRT model as 
outline in Chapter IV.  By having these teams of volunteers identified prior to the 
expeditionary operations, the USACE could respond quickly with the appropriate mix of 
people. 
2. Recommendation #2 
The USACE should enhance current training, and encourage team-building 
experience for the expeditionary workforce.  The recommendation is to train as a unit, so 
that the team building experience discussed in this paper can take place prior to any 
deployments.  Again, this follows the PRT model the USACE is currently using.  This 
will reduce workforce anxiety about working with a new group of people in unfamiliar 
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environments.  The recommendation will create a team atmosphere and commitment not 
only to the mission but also to the other team members.  To best prepare the 
expeditionary workforce, some training should be hands on real word experiences.  In 
addition to DAU’s proposed course work for contingency contracting officers, researches 
we recognize the USACE process and mission are unique.  Therefore, DAU coursework 
should be supplemented with training for construction contracting with the USACE.  
Again, we recommend that training take place as a whole team, vs. each skill set training 
separately.   
3. Recommendation #3  
The USACE should use monetary and non-monetary incentives to encourage 
contracting personnel to volunteer for deployments to GRD and AED.  The monetary 
incentives currently being offered, and those proposed are outlined in this paper.  
Researches agree that this is a factor in motivating people to volunteer for a deployment.  
There is, however, a concern that government employees do not receive the same tax-free 
benefits as contractors.  We therefore recommend that monetary incentives be expanded 
to include tax-free income during deployments.  While monetary incentives are important 
to the workforce, researches found that non-monetary incentives are also important.  We 
found that non-monetary incentive such as advanced training, TDY for team building, 
successful mission experience, HQ recognition, as well as encouragement from local 
command would create a sense of belonging to a unique unit with life experiences. 
4. Recommendation #4 
Recommend that USACE not adopt a mandatory contract specialist rotation.  
Based on the research of this paper, it is our recommendation that the USACE not adopt a 
mandatory contract specialist rotation in support of GRD and AED.  Though a mandated 
rotation will provide much needed resources for the GRD/AED and it will produce a 
better-staffed, more knowledgeable, and better-equipped workforce to meet mission 
requirements, it may also lead to morale problems within the civilian ranks, cause many  
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to seek employment elsewhere, and force some baby boomers into early retirement.  
Civilians are not soldiers and, for the most part, would not be receptive to forced 
deployments, especially to a dangerous location. 
Although this research team does not recommend a mandated rotation, however, 
they do recommend that the Corps study the possible effects a mandated rotation would 
have on its workforce at home as well as in the theater.  This study would give the Corps 
information of what to expect if a mandated rotation becomes necessary to meet its 
mission.  The study may also give the Corps information about its workforce that can 
assist future human capital planning.  The study should include an examination of the 
following:  
• The effect a mandated rotation will have on the morale 
• The effect a mandated rotation will have on recruiting and retaining 
acquisition professionals  
• Whether a mandated rotation will generate a large exodus of acquisition 
workers 
• Whether baby boomers will retire earlier than planned 
• Are there any viable alternatives that will cure the need for volunteers 
The study should also include a limited pilot program where USACE could obtain 
real life data that can be used to determine if mandated rotations are practicable.  The 
study should assess the financial feasibility of mandated rotations.  The results of the 
study can also be used in future expeditionary and contingency planning.  
5. Recommendation #5  
Recommend that the USACE seek new ways to recruit and retain contracting 
resources.  The USACE is currently experiencing a 25 percent vacancy rate for 
acquisition professionals.  The difficulties in recruiting and retaining workers in the 
acquisition series have made this vacancy rate seemingly impossible to erase.  It is 
therefore recommended that the USACE develop new strategies to attract new acquisition 
workers.  Recommend the USACE utilize commercial approaches such as job fairs, 
college outreach, and proven media outlets to attract applicants.  The USACE should also 
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make use of available incentive programs and/or develop and implement incentives that 
will be alluring to younger workers.  Resolving this issue will increase the number of 
acquisition professionals to support the GRD and AED missions. 
6. Recommendation #6 
Develop and implement a strategy to retain key older workers.   As identified in 
this study, the aging of the USACE acquisition workforce is having direct impact on 
mission accomplishment.  It is therefore recommended that the USACE develop and 
implement a strategy to retain older acquisition workers.  With the baby boomer 
generation entering retirement eligibility and not enough generation X and Y workers 
available, it is imperative that the USACE find ways to keep key older workers beyond 
their retirement eligibility years.  This will maintain the number of available workers as 
well as retaining much needed acquisition experience.  Some suggestions should 
consider– rehired annuitants, retention bonuses, and flexible work hours.  
7. Recommendation #7  
Further Research for the USACE leadership to consider.  Perform a study that 
includes a survey of contracting personnel that have volunteered for deployments with 
GRD and AED.  By conducting a comprehensive study, the USACE would gain insight 
as to employee, successes, challenges, and recommendations for improving expeditionary 
experiences.  We suggest this study include exit interviews of employees as they 
complete their assignments at the GRD and AED.   
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